Abstract: This paper analyses the dynamics of a monetary economy which is characterized by increasing returns to scale in …nancial intermediation. Due to the non-convexity, two stationary monetary equilibria may exist. The …rst equilibrium is a saddle with high economic activity and high competition in banking. In the second equilibrium, competition between banks and economic activity are low. Under adverse economic conditions, this equilibrium can bifurcate into a sink and the economy may experience periods of …nancial instability. However, since the resulting equilibrium will be indeterminate the predictive power of fundamental conditions is not contradictory to the random theory of …nancial crises.
Introduction
Almost any industrialised or newly industrialising country has at some time experienced periods of …nancial instability accompanied by serious economic dislocations and de ‡ation.
1 Therefore, it is widely believed that the condition of the …nancial system is of considerable importance for economic stability and performance. Despite this agreement, however, the way in which economic activity is a¤ected by the …nancial sector in times of crisis is still under debate. On one hand, it is argued that the …nancial system is inherently fragile and thus a source of extraneous instability.
On the other hand, a number of empirical studies point out that macroeconomic conditions have strong power in predicting the occurrence of …nancial crisis. This is taken as evidence that …nancial instabilities are not triggered by random events. Instead, the …nancial system is considered to amplify and propagate shocks which ultimately originate in the real sphere of the economy. The purpose of this paper is to analyse how the random withdrawal and the business cycle explanation of …nancial crisis can be related in a dynamic general equilibrium model. In particular it will be asked whether the fragility of the …nancial system can be indeed considered as independent of fundamental economic conditions and policy variables as is implicitly done in partial equilibrium analysis. The answer to this question has substantial implications for the design of monetary policy and …nancial regulation. Moreover, only if such a dependence does not exist can the explanatory power of economic conditions for crisis be taken as evidence against the random theory of …nancial instability.
The model which is used to analyse the preconditions for instability basically resembles the monetarist view of …nancial crisis. According to the monetarist view real …nancial crises are characterised by banking failures and contractions in money supply which threaten the stability of the banking system. 2 The failure of banks is considered to be precipitated by a loss of con…dence of the public. Due to the structural imbalance of banks' balance sheets and a sequential service constraint, a loss of con…dence can turn into a self-ful…lling prophecy 3 and initiate a multiple contraction in intermediated lending and economic activity.
1 See e.g. Allen/Gale (2000, Ch. 2) for a historical overview, and Lindgreen/Garcia/Saal (1996) for a summary of more recent events. 2 See Friedman/Schwartz (1963) and Schwartz (1986) . 3 See Diamond/Dybvig (1983) and Bryant (1980) for an early theoretical reference.
Although the monetarist view of …nancial crisis is broadly consistent with historical evidence, critics point out that it is overly narrow by exclusively focusing on the liability side of banks' balance sheet. Accordingly, monetary factors are considered as insu¢cient to explain the length and depth of many economic contractions which were accompanied by crisis of the …nancial system. 4 With reference to agency costs and adverse selection problems it is argued that an additional propagation mechanism has to be taken into account, which works through the asset side of banks' balance sheet. Since informational asymmetries substantially reduce the ability of …rms to substitute between di¤erent sources of external …nance, every factor affecting their capacity to attract loans will have an immediate impact on economic activity. According to the asymmetric information view this mechanism has to be at the center of any explanation of …nancial instability. The critique of the monetarist view of crisis serves as the starting point for the model which is developed in section two. The basic framework is a dynamic general equilibrium model in the spirit of Diamond (1965) and Tirole (1985) . Under conventional conditions this model delivers a unique, saddle-path stable monetary equilibrium. Thus, without any additional imperfections, instability can never occur. This result is obviously supportive for the asymmetric information view of crisis, which emphasises the importance of the …nancial structure. To account for this view, the second element of the model will be imperfections of the …nancial sector. In particular, a banking sector will be incorporated into the model with banks considered as producer of costly information about the credit-worthiness of borrowers. 5 It is assumed that the intermediation technology of banks is linear in deposits, but requires a …xed cost to be set-up and maintained. 6 The …xed cost can be understood as the expenditure necessary to overcome the informational advantage of borrowers with respect to their investment project. Once this information is acquired, banks can avoid the costly duplication of information. Thus, as proposed by Fama (1985) and consistently supported by empirical studies, intermediation activities have increasing returns to scale and the banking sector is characterised by imperfect competition.
The market structure in the banking sector is determined as the outcome of a two-stage oligopoly entry game. In any subgame perfect Nash-equilibrium of the entry game pro…ts from intermediation activities will be zero. Pro…t maximisation and increasing returns to scale then imply that the mark-up on lending cost as well as the market shares of banks are decreasing functions of intermediation activities. Thus, the model implies that a contraction in lending activity will decrease the number of active banks and increase the interest rate spread, as is usually observable in times of declining economic activity and …nancial crisis. The countercyclical behaviour of the interest rate spread and the variable number of active banks substantially a¤ects the dynamic behaviour of the model economy.
9
The zero-pro…t restriction for banking activities essentially establishes an entry condition which limits the ability of banks to increase the loan rate as the volume of lending decreases. As a result, the deposit rate must decrease if lending activities fall short of a certain threshold. Thus, and contrary to any conventional monetary general equilibrium model, the deposit rate is a hump-shaped function of lending activities. Therefore, a particular deposit rate can be consistent with two di¤erent levels of credit market activity.
10 Consequently, two stationary monetary equilibria may exist, where one of them is characterised by high intermediation activity and high competition in the …nancial sector, while the other is associated with a low level of competition and lending activity. The dynamic properties of the stationary equilibria are analysed in section 3. The analysis reveals that the high activity monetary equilibrium is always a saddle and corresponds to the unique stationary outside-money equilibrium of a standard monetary growth model. 11 In a standard monetary growth model saddle-path stability implies that the adjustment dynamics of the model economy are monotone and smooth. More important, a sudden withdrawal of funds from the banking sector can never be a rational expectations equilibrium. If intermediation activities are subject to increasing returns, however, this result (1999) for evidence on oligopolistic competition in banking. 8 See e.g. Stock/Watson (1989 , Friedman/Kuttner (1989) does not necessarily hold. The analysis will show that under su¢ciently favorable conditions in terms of savings, productivity and money growth, the low activity equilibrium will be unstable and cannot be approached on an equilibrium path. If economic fundamentals are weak, however, the low activity stationary state can bifurcate into a sink. In this case, the monetary equilibrium is indeterminate and the economy will be exposed to …nancial instabilities, where sudden withdrawals of funds from the banking system can initiate the failure of banks and a cumulative contraction in lending and investment activity. Thus, the model con…rms that imperfections of the …nancial system and weak economic fundamentals are the basic preconditions for …nancial instability. However, it also suggests that the predictive power of fundamental conditions cannot be taken as evidence against the random theory of …nancial crisis.
The economy

Households
The economy is populated by an in…nite sequence of overlapping generations of agents, indexed by time t = 0; 1; : : : Each agent lives for two periods, youth and old age. The total number of agents in each generation is constant and normalised to one.
Each agent maximises lifetime utility subject to his income stream. The utility function of an agent born at time t is U t (c t ; c t+1 ) = log c t +¯log c t+1 ;¯> 0; where c t and c t+1 denote the number of goods consumed at date t and t + 1, respectively.
All agents are identically endowed with one unit of labour in youth and nothing when old. Labour causes no disutility and working time is inelastically supplied. The real wage rate is denoted w t . In addition to his wage income each agent receives a subsidy from the government in old age. The subsidy paid to agents of generation t¸¡1 is denoted ¿ t t+1 . Thus, the intertemporal budget constraint for this agent is
where R t+1 denotes the gross real interest rate on savings. To maximise his life-time utility each agent saves an amount worth
( 1) units of goods in youth, where s´¯=(1 +¯). Savings can either be deposited with banks or held as …at money. Let m t denote real balances per capita and d t+1 savings per capita deposited with banks. Then,
For simplicity, any valuable di¤erence in transaction services between deposits and …at money is neglected. 12 Therefore, in any equilibrium with positive holdings of …at money the gross real rate of return on deposits, R d t+1 , must equal the gross yield on real money balances, 1=¼ t+1 , where ¼ t+1 denotes the in ‡ation factor:
Finally, there exists an initial generation of old agents at time t = 0 with an aggregate endowment of K 0 > 0 units of capital goods and M ¡1 > 0 units of …at money. Agents of this generation fully consume the gross returns of their endowment which is sold in the competitive markets for capital and money.
Firms
The homogenous good used in the economy is produced by competitive …rms. Each …rm has access to an identical production technology which has constant returns to scale and satis…es the Inada conditions. Inputs in production are capital K t and labour N t , which are both traded in perfectly competitive markets. Without loss of generality, it is assumed that capital depreciates completely in the production process.
Each …rm maximises pro…ts, taking all prices as given. Let k t´Kt =N t denote the capital to labour ratio, and f(k t ) the intensive production function. Then, pro…t maximisation implies that the real wage rate w t and the cost for capital ½ t satisfy
Banks
It is assumed that the investment activities of …rms are opaque for individual households. To eliminate this informational asymmetry monitoring activities are necessary. Since monitoring is costly, direct borrowing of …rms from households is dominated in returns by …nancial intermediation through banks. Banks are …nan-cial institutions who specialise in intermediation and monitoring activities to avoid the costly duplication of information disclosure. The time line of intermediation is as follows. At the end of each period t¸0 banks o¤er households the opportunity to deposit their savings. The funds obtained are loaned out to …rms, which commit to repaying their loans at the end of period t + 1. Banks then use the principal and interest on loans to serve their own liabilities.
At each date, the number of potential banks is large. Each of them has free access to an identical intermediation technology which is linear in deposits. However, to set up and operate the technology, an active bank has to pay a …xed amount of q j t units of …nal goods, where q j t represents the amount of resources necessary to eliminate the informational advantage of …rms with respect to their investment activities. It is assumed that the cost to set up and operate the technology is given by q j t´q =J t , where q is a non-negative constant and J t denotes the number of active banks. Thus, for a single bank the set-up cost for intermediation activities is proportionate to its market share, i.e. the number of borrowers, but otherwise independent of the size of the individual loans.
Let d
Subgame perfection requires that neither active nor inactive banks must want to change their entry decision at the second stage of the game. Thus, each active bank must earn zero pro…ts. Since all deposits will be loaned out, and l t´Jt l j t , zero pro…ts imply that the equilibrium mark-up over the deposit rate is a decreasing function of lending activities:
In addition, under Cournot competition the equilibrium interest rates must satisfy the modi…ed Lerner-condition
where ¡´denotes the aggregate demand elasticity for loans. Equation (7) determines the equilibrium number of banks as an increasing function of the aggregate volume of loans. Thus, the interest rate spread decreases while competition between banks increases with lending activities.
Government
The government issues the …at money which is used in the economy. The seignorage from money creation is transferred as lump-sum subsidy to the living old. Money creation and redistribution are the government's only activities. Let ¾ > 0 denote the constant gross growth rate of the money stock:
Then, for all t¸0 real balances must satisfy
and the lump-sum transfer is equal to
where ¼ t+1´pt+1 =p t denotes the gross rate of in ‡ation, real balances are de…ned as m t´Mt =p t , and p t is the period t money price of the single good.
General equilibrium
Dynamic equilibrium
In general equilibrium, the markets for capital, labour, deposits, loans, and money clear where prices and quantities solve the households' utility maximisation problem, the …rms' and intermediaries' pro…t maximisation problem and the equilibrium conditions for the entry game. Equilibrium in the market for capital, loans and deposits implies
and k t+1 = l t+1 = d t+1 . Thus, equations (1) - (4) and (8), (9) can be used to derive the law of motion for the capital to labour ratio as:
The law of motion for real money balances is already given by the money supply rule (8), once the arbitrage condition (3) is taken into account:
Finally, the …rst order condition for the …rms maximisation problem (5) and the equilibrium condition for market entry (6) can be used to express the deposit rate as a function of k:
Equations (11.a) and (11.b) form a two-dimensional dynamic system for the states k and m. Any sequence fk t ; m t g 1 0 satisfying these equations together with an initial condition k 0¸0 constitutes a dynamic equilibrium for the economy.
Stationary Equilibrium
In a stationary equilibrium, (k;m), the capital to labour ratio and real balances are constant. According to equations (11.a) and (11.b), a constant capital to labour ratio satis…es
while stationary real balances imply
According to the second equation, m t+1 = m t () k t+1 =k, which immediately reveals that any positive monetary stationary state must satisfy
The following proposition will be useful to characterise the solution of conditions (KK) and (MM ):
Then, a positive constant ¹ ¾ exists such that for all ¾ > ¹ ¾ equation (13) has at least two solutions.
Proof: Since the production function has constant returns to scale
is positive for at least some k while the Inada conditions imply that
The proposition follows from the continuity of R d (k);
According to Proposition 1 the deposit rate R d (k) is a hump-shaped function of lending activities. To simplify the exposition, it will be assumed that the maximum of this function is strict and unique. 13 Under this assumption the graph of the deposit rate function is as depicted in Figure 1 . The …gure reveals that the growth rate in the money supply must be at least ¹ ¾ for a stationary outside money equilibrium to exist. If this condition does not hold, real balances will completely devaluate and the economy will eventually approach a unique inside money stationary state.
14 Once the supply of liquidity is su¢ciently high, i.e. ¾ > ¹ ¾, as will be assumed throughout, any particular money growth rate is consistent with two di¤erent stationary equilibria in the credit market (see Figure 1) . One equilibrium, (k I ;m I ), is Figure 2 . The graph of equation (KK) is drawn assuming that the supply of …at money is consistent with a positive value of stationary real money balances, i.e.
The …gure reveals that in addition to the stationary monetary equilibria derived in Figure 1 two additional stationary states exist: a trivial stationary equilibrium at (0; 0) and one with a positive capital stock but zero valued …at money at ( ¹ k; 0). Moreover, the non-negativity constraint R d t+1¸0 implies that the trivial stationary equilibrium is an attractor for all k t < k ¡ . The properties of the remaining equilibria depend on economic fundamentals and will be discussed in the next section.
Adjustment dynamics
The dynamic adjustment of the state vector (k t ; m t ) is governed by equations (11.a) and (11.b), and can be characterised by the following pair of inequalities:
The second condition equivalently can be expressed as:
The phase diagram implied by these conditions is graphed in Figure 2 . The …gure immediately reveals that the stationary (inside money) equilibrium ( ¹ k; 0) is always a sink whereas the stationary high activity outside money equilibrium (k II ;m II ) is a saddle. The stability of the stationary low activity outside money equilibrium (k I ;m I ) is not immediately obvious. To analyse its local stability, the following functions are de…ned:
D(k) and T (k) denote the determinant and trace of the Jacobian matrix of the dynamic system, evaluated at a steady state. The combinations of D(k) and T (k)
with Á 1 (k) and Á 2 (k) equal to zero serve as benchmark values to determine the qualitative properties of the Eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix. 15 The Jacobian J can be derived as
with determinant
and trace
Several properties of D(k) and T (k) are immediately obvious from equations (14) and (15): since w 0 (k) is a positive and decreasing function, the determinant is always greater than zero, and the lower the higherk. Moreover, as can be seen from equation (MM ), at any monetary stationary equilibrium sw(k) ¡k is positive. Thus, according to equation (15) To establish the properties of the low activity equilibrium, …rst note thatk is a correspondence of the money growth rate with dk I (¾)=d¾ < 0 and dk II (¾)=d¾ > 0.
Moreover,
Since the determinant and trace are both continuous ink, a correspondence between ¾ and (D(k); T (k)) exists. 16 This correspondence is denoted AB in Figure 3 . In addition, if k m denotes the maximum of the equilibrium function (KK)
15 See Azariadis (1993) , Ch. 6.4, for a comprehensive discussion. 16 See the Appendix for further details. it is straightforward to show that
Thus, if k + < k m , the low activity monetary stationary equilibrium can never be a sink because the determinant evaluated at this steady state necessarily exceeds one. Otherwise, however, the following proposition holds:
Then there exists a critical capital to labour ratio k c 2 (k m ; k + ) such that for allk 2 (k c ; k + ) the low activity stationary monetary equilibrium will be a sink.
Proof: It is straightforward to show thatk < k
Thus, at the low activity equilibrium both Eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix are on the same side of +1. Moreover, the expressions for D(k) and T (k) immediately reveal that Á 2 (k + ) > 0: Since Á 2 (k) is continuous, both Eigenvalues must be on the same side of ¡1, ifk is su¢ciently close to k
these Eigenvalues must be less than one in absolute value, which implies that the equilibrium is a sink. On the other hand, lim k&k ¡ Á 2 (k) < 0, which implies that the equilibrium is a saddle with negative Eigenvalues fork close to k ¡ . Thus there must exist a critical value k c where the equilibrium loses stability ask approaches k ¡ from above. The continuity of Á 2 (k) also implies that the Eigenvalues must be complex for somek 2 (k c ; k + ). In this case the low activity stationary equilibrium will be a stable spiral. ¤ Under the stated conditions, a bifurcation point must exist. The bifurcation either occurs because Á 2 (k) decreases below zero (Flip bifurcation) or the determinant increases above one (Hopf bifurcation). An immediate corollary of Proposition 2 is:
Corollary 3 Proposition 2 implies that there exists a critical growth rate for the stock of …at money,
, such that the low activity equilibrium will be a sink i¤ ¾ 2 (¾ c ; ¹ ¾): Moreover, whenever ¾ is su¢ciently high, the low activity equilibrium will be a saddle with negative Eigenvalues.
The economic implications of Proposition 2 and Corollary 3 will be discussed in the next section.
Implications
Financial instability
Conventional monetary growth models usually possess a single monetary stationary equilibrium which is saddle-path stable. Thus, any adjustment-path towards this long-run equilibrium is determinate and smooth. The economic intuition of this property is straightforward. If agents would decide to reduce deposits below the equilibrium level the interest rate would rise. For the higher level of real money balances to be consistent with a portfolio equilibrium, the expected returns on money balances would have to rise as well. This, however, would require an even higher money demand in the period ahead, and so on. Although the increased demand for money could be economically feasible for several periods, the sequence can never be a rational expectations equilibrium, because the economy would eventually diverge.
17
Contrary to the standard monetary growth model, however, this is not generally true if the intermediation technology has increasing returns to scale.
If economies of scale are present, a sudden withdrawal of deposits from the banking system will increase the average cost of lending. As a result, pro…ts as well as the number of active banks will decrease. Consequently, the interest rate spread must rise as well. At the same time, however, competition restricts the power of banks to push up the loan rate. Thus, the deposit rate must eventually fall as the level of borrowings decreases. This mechanism gives birth to a second stationary equilibrium and opens the possibility of …nancial instability. Since the deposit rate adjustment reduces de ‡ationary pressures it will …nally slow down the process of disintermediation. If this e¤ect is su¢ciently strong, the low activity equilibrium will be stable and a sudden withdrawal of deposits from the banking system is a possible dynamic equilibrium for the economy. In addition to the unique saddle-path towards the high activity stationary equilibrium, an in…nite number of feasible paths towards the low activity stationary equilibrium now exists. Thus, the dynamic equilibrium will be indeterminate and the economy is prone to …nancial instabilities and extrinsic uncertainty where sudden withdrawals of funds from the banking system can initiate a self-ful…lling contraction in lending, investment and production.
Monetary policy
The properties of the low activity stationary state substantially a¤ect the dynamic behaviour of the economy. These properties in turn depend on the prevailing stationary capital to labour ratiok; and thus, on economic fundamentals and the growth rate of …at money ¾. As the growth rate of …at money increases from ¹ ¾ to 1 the low activity stationary capital to labour ratiok I monotonically decreases while the high activity stationary capital to labour ratiok II monotonically increases (see Figure 1) . The correspondence of ¾ and (D(k); T (k)) is denoted AB in Figure 3 . The …gure shows that the …nancial system will be stable only for growth rates of …at money belonging to the line segment ab. If ¾ is either too low or too high, …nancial instabilities can occur. For low rates of …at money growth in ‡ation is low or prices even de ‡ate. Thus, the return on real money balances is high and the deposit rate which has to be paid in order to attract funding must be high as well. Therefore, lending will be relatively expensive, the volume loans will be low, and the …nancial system will be fragile. On the other hand, if money grows at an excessive rate, in ‡ation will be high while returns on real balances are low. Moreover, given the high level of economic activity, a contraction in lending activities will cause substantial downward pressure on deposit rates. Thus, a withdrawal of deposits will be rational, if agents expect a downturn to occur.
It is important to note that the possibility of …nancial instability is not related to the characteristics of …at money per se. Instabilities arise because of the multiplicity and indeterminacy of the stationary equilibrium.
18 However, the ability to control the money supply endows the monetary authority with an e¤ective tool to increase the …nancial sector's stability. At the most basic level, a stabilisation of the …nancial system requires to choose ¾ within the stable region. However, external constraints or attempts to ensure dynamic e¢ciency may well lead to situations in which the desired growth rate of the money stock is incompatible with these values. The model con…rms that even in this case the monetary authority can increase the …nancial sector's stability if it is willing to act as a lender of last resort and to provide any amount of liquidity necessary to compensate the banking sector for a sudden withdrawal of funds. If the monetary authority has su¢cient knowledge of the underlying economy and can credibly commit to this course of action, it can coordinate the beliefs of private agents in a way that will invalidate any undesirable path of the state variables as a dynamic equilibrium for the economy.
Fundamental conditions
In addition to the growth rate of …at money, the stability of the low activity equilibrium is determined by economic fundamentals. Most important are the cost of intermediation, q, and the rate of savings, s. In addition, let z and µ denote the probability of loan repayments and a productivity parameter, respectively, and replace equations (4) and (10) by
and
18 For a further discussion of indeterminacy in real and monetary models see Benhabib/Farmer (1999) . Given these de…nitions, the equilibrium reactions of the model with respect to changing fundamentals can be summarised by the following proposition:
is strictly concave at the low activity stationary equilibrium. Then, for any D; the trace T will decrease if: a) the cost factor q increases, b) the saving rate s decreases, c) the probability of loan repayment z decreases, d) the productivity parameter µ decreases.
Proof : See the Appendix.
According to Proposition 4 the correspondence of ¾ and (D; T ) will shift to the left in the T -D plane if q increases, or either s, z, or µ decreases. This reaction is shown in Figure 4 . As a result of the change in fundamentals the line segment associated with a stable …nancial system, ab, shrinks to a 0 b 0 . Thus, according to the model economies with strong economic fundamentals -a high e¢ciency of the …nancial system (a low q), a high level of savings and productivity, and a low rate of defaults on loans -will face a lower risk of …nancial instability. This …nding is broadly consistent with empirical observations and implies that the basic reason for …nancial instability is adverse economic conditions, even if the …nal outbreak of a crisis may be due to extrinsic uncertainty. At the same time, however, the model suggests that the predictive power of economic conditions for the occurrence of crisis which is observable in empirical data cannot be taken as evidence against the random withdrawal theory of …nancial instability.
Conclusion
In this paper a dynamic general equilibrium model is used to analyse the preconditions for …nancial instabilities and contagion e¤ects. The model describes a life cycle economy with …nancial intermediation and monetary growth. The intermediation technology is subject to increasing returns to scale, and the …nancial sector is imperfectly competitive. The non-convexity in the intermediation technology induces a countercyclical spread between the borrowing and the lending rate, whereas the equilibrium interest rate on deposits is a hump-shaped function of lending activities. The shape of the deposit rate functions has important consequences for the dynamic behaviour of the economy. Since a particular interest rate can be consistent with two di¤erent levels of borrowing, two stationary monetary equilibria may exist. The …rst equilibrium is characterised by high economic activity and high competition in the …nancial sector, whereas the second equilibrium is associated with low competition and low lending activities.
One of the main …ndings of the paper is that the high activity equilibrium -which corresponds to the unique stationary monetary equilibrium of a standard monetary growth model -is always a saddle, while under su¢ciently favorable conditions the low activity equilibrium will be unstable and cannot be approached in a dynamic equilibrium. If economic fundamentals are weak, however, the low activity equilibrium can bifurcate into a sink and the monetary equilibrium will be indeterminate. In this situation, even small disturbances in the banking sector can induce large withdrawals of funds and initiate a cumulative process of disintermediation.
The stability conditions for the low activity equilibrium have revealed that it is primarily economies with weak economic fundamentals in terms of intermediation cost, productivity and savings that will be exposed to instabilities of their …nan-cial system. Moreover, equally important for stability is the growth rate of money supply because it immediately a¤ects the liquidity of banks. A monetary policy that is either too tight or too loose can render the low activity equilibrium stable and increase the …nancial sector's fragility. However, if the monetary authority can credibly commit to provide su¢cient liquidity should a sudden withdrawal of funds occur, it can co-ordinate the beliefs of agents in a way that will eliminate the indeterminacy which is responsible for the …nancial sector's fragility.
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Lemma 5 Suppose R d (k) is concave atk I , and let´i denote the partial derivative of´with respect to i 2 fk I ; q; z; µg. Then:k < 0;´q > 0;´z < 0;´µ < 0:
Proof: The partial derivative of´with respect tok equals @ @k´(k I ; q; z; µ)
In this expression R d00´@ R d2 =@ 2 k < 0 and
Thus, the rhs of is negative.
The partial derivative of´with respect to q equals @ @q´(k I ; q; z; µ) = R
where R d0 q´@ R d0 =@q > 0; R d0 > 0; and R d q < 0. Thus, the rhs of this expression is positive.
The partial derivative of´with respect to q and µ equals @ @z´(k I ; q; z; µ) = R
where R positive. Thus, the rhs of both expressions is negative. ¤ Lemma 6 Suppose, the production function has constant returns to scale and the marginal productivity of labour is positive for k < 1: Then w 0 k=w ¡ 1 w 00 k=w 0 = 1:
Proof : Since the production function has constant returns to scale and the marginal productivity of labour is positive, the wage function is homogenous of degree » 2 (0; 1), its partial derivative is homogenous of degree » ¡ 1, and its second partial derivative is homogenous of degree » ¡2: Thus, w(» ¡1) = w 0 k; and w 0 (» ¡ 2) = w 00 k. ¤
Proof of Proposition 4
The derivative of D with respect to ¾ is dD d¾ = @D @k I @k I @¾ :
Since @D=@k I and @k=@¾ are always non-zero, dD=d¾ 6 = 0, and the implicit function theorem applies. Thus, T and D can be expressed as a parametric function of ¾ with slope
The graph of this function is denoted AB in Figure 3 . Moreover: Thus, given Lemma 5 and 6, the change of T can be derived as
